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WHAT CONSTITUTES DOING BUSINESS
IN VIRGINIA
At Common Law in the absence of consent, jurisdiction could
not be acquired over a foreign corporation, even though it was doing
business within the state.' However, consistant with their power to
exclude foreign corporations, most states have provided for in per-
sonam proceedings against them. The basis for this type of pro-
ceeding is the doing of business within a state by the foreign cor-
poration. It is the purpose of this note to review the rules laid
down in the more important decisions in Virginia with the view of
furnishing a guide as to what constitutes the transacting of business
in this state.
The mere fact that a defendant is a non-residert does not oust
courts of general jurisdiction of their jurisdiction over him, if the
defendant. is found and served with process within the territorial
limits of such courts' jurisdiction. A foreign corporation, however,
can not be said to be found within a jurisdiction in which it does
no business and has neither agent nor property. Thus, the domestic
courts have no power to render judgements against them without
voluntary appearance.2
The general rule is, that when a foreign corporation transacts
some substantial part of its ordinary business in a state, it is doing,
transacting, carrying on, or engaging in business therein within the
meaning of the particular state statute under consideration.3 The
Restatement4 gives a short, concise definition, as follows: "Doing
of business is doing a series of similar acts for the purpose of thereby
realizing pecuniary benefit, or otherwise accomplishing an object,
or doing of a single act for such a purpose with the intention of
thereby initiating a series of such acts."
It is held in most jurisdictions that a single act of business in
a particular state does not constitute the doing of business so as to
bring a foreign corporation within the jurisdiction of its courts.s
If, however, this single transaction is the firpt of a series to be car-
ried on, then the regular rule of acquiring jurisdiction applies.
In Walton v. Commonwealth,6 an embalmer and funeral direc-
tor, who was licensed under the laws of Tennessee, prepared for
burial a body brought to him in Tennessee from Virginia and there-
after took charge of the funeral and burial in Virginia. An im-
portant issue of the case was whether the funeral director was doing
business within this state. The court held that doing business or
conducting a business, for licensing purposes, requires doing more
than one act; there must be a performance of a continuous series of
acts, the idea of continuity or sustained activity being implicit in
the terms.
Is the purchasing of land on which there later will be built
a business corporation, the doing of business and what if this pur-
chase is made outside of Virginia but affects Virginia realty? These
points make up the body of Goldberry 'v. Carter.7 The plaintiff
sued the former director of a foreign corporation that owed the
plaintiff a sum of money, the defendant being a responsible party
because of his directorship. Failure to appoint an agent for purposes
of service on a foreign corporation doing business within the state,S
made officers, agents and employees of the foreign corporation
liable for debts of the said corporation.9 From the evidence it
seemed that the defendant was a director from May 19, 1897 until
August or September of that year, during which time, the land on
which the corporation later built tracks and started mining activities
was purchased. The purchase and sale of the land took place in
West Virginia.
Was this single act during the defendant's directorship. which
placed the company in business here later on, the doing of business
within this state so as to support a suit of this nature under the
above named sections of the Code?
The court said it was not, leaning heavily on the fact that the
sale was made out of this state and the prohibition in the statute is
against doing of business here, and not against doing of business
abroad which related to property in this state.
It is possible to draw the inference that had the contract been
local the court might have held otherwise, if it would have connected
this so called single act with the others which made the corporation
a going concern.
Do the words, doing business, have reference to the exercise
of some commercial or manufacturing enterprise exclusively? The
Virginia view is that they do not.xo The Knights of the K.K.K.,
chartered under the laws of Georgia as a benevolent and eleemosyn-
ary society, without capital stock, to conduct a patriotic, secret, social
order, were held to be doing business in Virginia by establishing
local klans, receiving and transmitting initiation and membership
fees and hence subject to fineut for failing to obtain the certificate
required.-2
After International Harvester Company of America v. Com-
monwealth of Kentucky,13 it became the general rule that even
though the business transacted within a state may be entirely inter-
state in nature, a foreign corporation may, nevertheless, be deemed
present for purposes of service by the nature of its business con-
ducted within that state. Two Virginia decisions involving inter-
state commerce still tended to regard and separate inter and intra-
state activities when dealing with this problem. The Virginia Su-
preme Court based its decisions in both cases on the fact that the
intrastate activities were sufficient to make the corporation amen-
able but it seemed to regard purely interstate activities as immune.
In General Railway Signal Co. v. Commonwealth 4 a foreign
corporation, for lump sums, made and performed contracts to fur-
nish completed automatic railway signal systems in Virginia. The
materials, supplies, machinery devices and equipment were brought
from without, but their installation as structures permanently at-
tached to the soil required the employment of local labor, digging
of ditches, construction of concrete foundations and painting. The
court held that local business was involved, separate and distinct
from interstate commerce, and that the foreign corporation was sub-
ject to the licensing power of the state. The defendants argued to
no avail that it was impossible to establish a complete signal system
without some incidental hiring of labor in Virginia and that such
an attempt by the State was the height of injustice.
A case substantially in accord with the above, in which there
was an attempt to point out a safe role that might be played by
foreign corporations in activities of this mixed nature, is Common-
wealth ex rel. Corporation Commission v. Western Gas Construc-
tion Co.is A foreign corporation made a sale out of state calling
for the installation and erection of certain gas machines and equip-
ment in this state, involving extensive construction work. It was
held that this constituted the doing of business in the state and ren-
dered the corporation liable'6 for having failed to take out a license
therefor, the essence of the undertaking being the construction en-
gaged in; the sale of machines and equipment being incidental
thereto.
The Court held that there were two lines of activity that might
be pursued by the foreign corporation. After the corporation com-
pleted the sale of the article it might send an engineer to oversee the
installation, the responsibility for which was to be in the hands of
the buyer; that is to say, it might supervise the erection of and make
a test of the completed plant without entering into activities involv-
ing the employment of local labor, or it might choose the method
actually pursued in this case, namely, assume the entire respon-
sibility for all the details. In choosing the latter course a foreign
corporation localizes its activities, thus bringing itself within the
doing of business doctrine.
In the case of drummers and traveling salesmen and the like,
whose activities are confined to the soliciting of orders, the rule
seems to be generally accepted that this activity is not the doing of
business.'7 This rule rests upon the theory that the orders taken
for the goods by traveling salesmen in the employment of a foreign
corporation do not constitute the contract itself, and the contract
has existence only from the time of confirmation of the order. There
is, however, a situation called by some,,8 solicitation plus. In this
type of situation the agent goes further than just the soliciation; he
may perform services, resell articles, employ local labor, and many
other activities. By engaging in this increased activity the agent
or corporation many times renders itself amenable to the jurisdiction
of the state's courts under the doing of business theory. The land-
mark case in Virginia in regard to this type of activity is Dalton Add-
ing Machine Co. v. Commo,wealth.'9
An Ohio corporation, Dalton Adding Machine Co. did an
annual business in Virginia totaling $18,000. Its agents took orders
for machines which were sent to the home office and if accepted, the
machines were sent to the buyer or the agent for delivery to the
buyer. In addition to this the corporation carried 'on other activi-
ties: (1) it accepted other machines as trade-ins and disposed of
them as best it could, (2) maintained servicing units with spare parts
for machines and hired a local mechanic to do repairs, (3) it rented
certain machines, and then if the lessee wanted to buy that machine
the rent was abated from the purchase price.
The Corporation Commission fined the company for violating
the Virginia statute,zo claiming the company was doing business with-
out getting the required license. The defendant appealed, claim-
ing its activities were interstate commerce. The court held that
a substantial part of the company's transactions were fundamentally
of an intrastate nature, and for that reason the courts will not allow
the guise of interstate commerce to be used to cover these activities
so as to prevent the state from enforcing its jurisdiction and licens-
ing fine for the failure to comply with its statute.21
A foreign cooperative marketing association was held to be doing
business in Virginia, when it performed such acts as assisting farmers
in the preparation of their cattle within the state, and also engaged
in the sale to Virginia buyers of cattle from out of state.22
A foreign insurance corporation issuing a policy of iisurance to
a domestic corporation through an agent in another state wants to
collect certain assessments by virtue of that insurance contract.
There are specific statutes regulating the activities of foreign in-
surance corporations which the insurance company ignored, resting
on the idea that its activities were strictly interstate. Under these
circumstances may it have access to the Virginia courts? In Issac
Fass, Inc. v. Pink, Superintendent of Insurance of State of New
York,23 it was held that the policies required the company to perform
certain acts in this state such as investigation, adjustment and the
settlement of claims against the insured, and the defense of suits
which might be brought against the latter. These acts constituted
the doing of business in this state, and since the business was carried
on in violation of the provisions of the statutes the State had a right
to deny the use of its courts.24
How long is a foreign corporation doing business in a state?
A foreign corporation, which in the past has done business in Vir-
ginia, is doing business in Virginia as long as it has contracts in the
state unperformed. The mere leaving of the jurisdiction or ceas-
ing present activities does not withdraw the corporation from the
jurisdiction of the state because the courts still regard the corporation
as doing business, and thus retaining it within the scope of the state's
jurisdiction.25
Two recent decisions highlight the doctrine, where the business
is being conducted on a federal reservation within the state. In
the Chamberlain Hotel Case,26 where a guest sued the hotel for a
tort injury, it was held that the doing of business by a foreign cor-
poration within a military reservation in Virginia has the same
effect so far as submitting itself to process is concerned as doing
business elsewhere within the state, where the state has reserved
the right of service of process.
In Hercules Powder Company v. Ruben, 27 there was an action
by a former employee for breach of contract involving $350 against
a Delaware corporation doing business on a federal reservation. Vir-
ginia had granted the Federal government exclusive jurisdiction re-
serving the right to serve process in civil and criminal suits. The
Supreme Court of Appeals held that although the federal lands were
within the county, the county's jurisdiction stopped where the reser-
vation began. Since this cause of action arose on a federal reser-
vation the service of process was held invalid. The clause was
intended to prevent the reservation becoming a sanctuary for debtors
and criminals as to causes of action arising outside of the reservation
and did not affect exclusive jurisdiction of the United States gov-
ernment as to causes arising within the reservation.
These two cases involving the same problem of service are in
direct conflict. The holding in the latter case seems unfortunate
because it would make it necessary for an injured party who has
a small claim, to go to a foreign state, in the Hercules case, Dela-
ware, in order to get service on the corporate wrong-doer. It
thrusts upon foreign courts the duty of trying a cause happening
solely in Virginia. Also, the person harmed must undergo in-
creased expense in order to obtain justice. The reasoning of Judge
Parker in' the Knott case is sound and would permit a more just
result. He says, "Corporations doing business on the reservation
come into contact with the citizens of Virginia and do business with
them in the same way as foreign corporations doing business else-
where within the state and there is the same reason for making them
amenable to process in the local courts. Since the state has retained
the right to serve process on foreign corporations as well as others
within the reservation and has the power to say what shall constitute
such service, it follows that any act which may be legally taken as
an acceptance of service elsewhere within the state may be so taken
within the reservation. This reservation means that the doing of
business by a foreign corporation within the reservation has the
same effect so far as submitting itself to local jurisdiction for the
service of process is concerned, as doing business elsewhere within
the state." It would be far better to follow this decision and allow
the local courts to try causes of this nature.
If the case be one in which the defendant non-resident might
be unwittingly carrying on business (which might arise an a part of
the state where the borderline is in dispute), the courts will care-
fully scrutinize the process itself and the circumstances under which
it was issued and served, in contravention of his natural right to be
sued at home.28
A foreign corporation which in every practical aspect owns a
domestic corporation may be held to be doing business within the
state where the domestic corporation is located.29
In conclusion it must be noted that whether a corporation is
doing business in a state in such a way as to render it subject to
the jurisdiction of the courts thereof, depends upon the facts of each
particular case. Cases of mere solicitation and single acts of business
are generally held not within the doctrine, but where the activities
have become substantially localized the courts have little reluctance
in finding that the corporation has rendered itself amenable, in order
to protect the rights of its citizens.
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